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1 Introduction
Discussions on the potential business cycle amplication e¤ects of Basel II started long before
its approval in 2004 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2004). The
argument whereby these e¤ects may occur is well-known. In recessions, losses erode banks
capital, while risk-sensitive capital requirements such as those in Basel II become higher. If
banks cannot quickly raise su¢ cient new capital, they will be forced to reduce their lending,
thereby contributing to the worsening of the downturn. However, a reduction in capital
requirements makes banks riskier, so there is a trade-o¤.
The purpose of this paper is to construct a simple model of optimal capital regulation that
illustrates this trade-o¤. The model has a continuum of banks that di¤er in an observable
characteristic (their risk type) that is related to their incentives to take risk. Banks may
fund their investments with uninsured deposits and equity capital. There is a moral hazard
problem in the choice of risk that implies ine¢ cient risk-shifting under debt nance, which
capital serves to ameliorate. A regulator sets risk-sensitive capital requirements in order to
maximize a social welfare function that incorporates a social cost of bank failure. This yields
a capital charge curve that is increasing in the banksrisk type. We consider a short-run
situation (or one with severe capital market frictions) in which bank capital is exogenously
xed, and study the e¤ects of a negative shock to the aggregate supply of bank capital.1 We
show that the optimal response to the shock is to lower capital requirements. Failure to do
so would keep banks safer but produce a large reduction in aggregate investment. The result
provides a rationale for the cyclical adjustment of risk-sensitive capital requirements.
The paper is closely related to Kashyap and Stein (2004). They present a framework
(which is developed in the longer working paper version of their article) in which there is
a regulator that cares about bank lending as well as the social cost of bank failure. They
conclude that instead of there being a single once-and-for-all curve that maps risk mea-
sures into capital charges, optimality requires a family of point-in-time curves, with each
curve corresponding to (...) di¤erent macroeconomic conditions. In their model there is
1This is the same approach as in Holmström and Tirole (1997).
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a representative bank that maximizes the expected return of a portfolio of di¤erent types
of risky loans. There is also a regulator that maximizes the expected return of the banks
portfolio minus a reduced-form term that captures the social cost of bank failure. The reg-
ulator chooses capital requirements for each type of loan in order to maximize its objective
function subject to a capital availability constraint. The shadow value of bank capital is the
Lagrange multiplier associated to this constraint. They conclude that when bank capital is
scarce, its shadow value will be high, and the regulator should lower capital requirements.
Although their intuition is the same as ours, the models are very di¤erent. Kashyap and
Stein do not consider the e¤ect of limited liability, ignoring that the convexity of the banks
objective function implies that it would want to specialize in only one type of loans (see
Repullo and Suarez, 2004). They also take as exogenous the risk-adjusted discount rate for
each type of loan, a variable that should in principle depend on the (endogenous) capital
requirement for each type of loan. Finally, they model in a reduced-form manner the e¤ect
of capital on the probability of bank failure.
In contrast, our approach does not su¤er from these shortcomings. Building on Repullo
(2005), in our model a continuum of banks with di¤erent risk types have an investment
opportunity of size one that may be funded by risk-neutral depositors and outside equity
investors. There is an innitely elastic supply of uninsured deposits at an expected return
that is normalized to zero and a xed aggregate supply of bank capital, so the cost of capital
is endogenously determined in equilibrium. After raising the required funds, each bank
chooses a risk parameter that, together with its type, determines its probability of failure.
The banks choice of risk is not observed by depositors, so there is a (risk-shifting) moral
hazard problem.
We rst characterize the equilibrium of the model in the absence of regulation. Inter-
estingly, banks will in general want to have capital in order to ameliorate the moral hazard
problem. The trade-o¤ is that capital helps on the moral hazard front, but it is in general
more expensive than deposits. In fact, when the cost of capital equals the return required
by depositors there is no trade-o¤, and banks would only be funded with equity.
We then introduce a risk-neutral regulator that faces the same informational constraints
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as the market, in particular the inability to observe the bankschoice of risk. For this reason,
the regulator resorts to using capital requirements to indirectly inuence banksrisk-taking.
Unlike in the Basel II regulation, which is based on targeting an exogenous probability of
failure for all banks, here the regulator maximizes societys welfare subject to the capital
availability constraint. The social welfare function incorporates a term that captures the
negative externalities associated with bank failures. Of course, if bank failures entailed no
social cost, the market equilibrium would be e¢ cient, and bank capital regulation would not
be justied. In contrast, when there is a social cost of bank failure, the regulator requires
banks to have more capital than they would choose in the absence of regulation. But there is
a trade-o¤: although banks will be safer, aggregate investment will be lower. We show that
the optimal regulation may be implemented as a risk-based schedule of minimum capital
requirements, with banks of riskier types facing higher capital requirements.
Finally, we consider the e¤ect of a negative shock to the aggregate supply of bank capital,
which could be interpreted as the result of a downturn of the economy that produces losses
that erode bankscapital. Obviously, our modelling approach implicitly assumes the exis-
tence of capital market imperfections that make it impossible for banks to raise new capital.
We show that the shock increases the shadow value of bank capital and consequently reduces
optimal capital requirements. We also show that if capital requirements are kept unchanged,
the reduction in the supply of bank capital will be accommodated by a signicant reduction
in bank lending and aggregate investment. However, the corresponding reduction in social
welfare is mitigated by the fact that the operating banks will be safer than in the optimal
regulation.
The literature on the procyclical e¤ects of risk-sensitive bank capital regulation has grown
in recent years. The closest paper is Repullo and Suarez (2013). In contrast with our
static setup, they consider a dynamic model of relationship lending in which banks are
unable to access the equity markets every period and the business cycle is modeled as a
two-state Markov process that determines the loansprobabilities of default. They compare
the performance of several capital regulation regimes, including one that maximizes social
welfare. Their analysis is complicated by the fact that to protect their future lending capacity,
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banks will in general choose to have capital in excess of the minimum required by regulation.
They show that the risk-based requirements of Basel II are more procyclical than the at
requirements of the earlier Basel I regulation, but make banks safer. They also show that
Basel II dominates Basel I in terms of social welfare except for low values of the social
cost of bank failure. In contrast with our static model, in their dynamic model shocks to
bank capital come from defaults of past loans. However, they do not have a cross-sectional
distribution of bank risks, since all the loans granted in any period have the same probability
of default.
Other related literature includes the early contributions of Daníelsson et al. (2001) and
Gordy and Howells (2006), and the more recent of Brunnermeier et al. (2009), Hanson,
Kashyap, and Stein (2011), and Shleifer and Vishny (2010), which note the potential im-
portance of the procyclical e¤ects of risk-sensitive capital requirements and elaborate on the
pros and cons of the various policy options for their correction.
The procyclicality problem received considerable attention in statements of the G-20
following the failure of Lehman Brothers.2 The 2010 agreement of the Basel Committee
(BCBS, 2010a), known as Basel III, refers to the following four key objectives: dampen
any excess cyclically of the minimum capital requirement, promote more forward looking
provisions, conserve capital to build bu¤ers that can be used in stress, and achieve the broader
macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess credit growth.
However, there is essentially nothing in Basel III on the rst two objectives.3 The third
objective gave rise to the capital conservation bu¤er, and the fourth to the countercyclical
capital bu¤er. While the capital conservation bu¤er is a reasonable proposal in the spirit
of prompt corrective action provisions of the 1992 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDCIA), Repullo and Saurina (2012) argue that the proposed capital
conservation bu¤er (see BCBS, 2010b) might actually exacerbate the procyclical e¤ects of
2For example, in the November 2008 Washington Summit the G-20 instructed the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), and the Basel Committee to develop recommendations
to mitigate procyclicality, including the review of how valuation and leverage, bank capital, executive com-
pensation, and provisioning practices may exacerbate cyclical trends.
3To mitigate the excess cyclicality of the minimum capital requirement, Repullo, Saurina, and Trucharte
(2011) propose to use a business cycle multiplier that would be an increasing function of GDP growth.
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the regulation, because the variable on which it is based (the credit-to-GDP gap) tends to
be negatively correlated with GDP growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and char-
acterizes the equilibrium in the absence of regulation. Section 3 introduces a social cost
of bank failure and characterizes the optimal bank capital regulation. Section 4 provides a
numerical illustration of the previous results. Section 5 discusses the e¤ects of a negative
shock to the aggregate supply of bank capital under optimally adjusted and xed capital
requirements. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A shows that the results are robust to the
introduction of an elastic aggregate supply of bank capital, and Appendix B contains the
proofs of the analytical results.
2 The Model
Consider an economy with two dates (t = 0; 1); a continuum of risk-neutral banks described
by their (observable) type  2 [0; 1], and a large set of risk-neutral investors that can fund
the banks with uninsured deposits and outside equity capital. The distribution of potential
bank types  is assumed to be uniform in the interval [0; 1].
At t = 0 a bank of type  can invest one unit of funds in a risky asset that yields a
stochastic payo¤ at t = 1 given by
R =
(
maxfa(2   p); 0g;
0;
with probability p;
with probability 1  p; (1)
where a > 1 is a parameter that characterizes the protability of the banksinvestments,
and p 2 [0; 1] is a parameter privately chosen by the bank at t = 0; which is the source of the
(risk-shifting) moral hazard problem.4 Notice that higher risk (lower p) is associated with a
higher success payo¤.5
The functional form in (1) implies
 = argmax
p
p [a(2   p)] :
4The maxf; 0g operator ensures that the success payo¤ is always nonnegative.
5This setup is borrowed from Allen and Gale (2000) and is essentially the moral hazard model in Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981).
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This means that in the absence of moral hazard, a bank of type  would choose p = ; which
is the (rst-best) probability of success that maximizes the banks expected payo¤. For this
reason, we will refer to banks with high (low) s as safer (riskier) banks.
Banks may fund their investment by raising funds from uninsured depositors, that require
an expected return that is normalized to 0; and from outside equity investors, that require
an expected (excess) return   0:6 We assume that there is a xed aggregate supply of bank
capital K; so the cost of capital  will be endogenously determined.
In the absence of regulation, banks choose at t = 0 the amount of capital k 2 [0; 1] and
deposits 1  k; as well the (gross) interest rate b o¤ered to the depositors and the ownership
share  2 [0; 1] o¤ered to the outside shareholders, so an ownership share 1   is retained
by the inside shareholders who manage the bank.
For a given cost of capital ; the optimal nancing contract for a bank of type  is a
solution (k(; ); b(; ); (; ); p(; )) to the following problem
max
(k;b;;p)
(1  )p [a(2   p)  b(1  k)] (2)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
p(; ) = argmax
p
p [a(2   p)  b(; )(1  k(; ))] ; (3)
the depositorsparticipation constraint
p(; )b(; ) = 1; (4)
and the outside shareholdersparticipation constraint
(; )p(; ) [a(2   p(; ))  b(; )(1  k(; ))] = (1 + )k(; ): (5)
The objective function in (2) is the expected payo¤ of the inside shareholders, which
equals their ownership share 1    multiplied by the probability of success p and by the
di¤erence between the success return a(2   p) and the promised debt repayment b(1  k):
6Notice that the maximum expected payo¤ of the investment of a bank of type  is [a(2   )] = a2:
The assumption a > 1 implies that in the absence of moral hazard banks with types   a 1=2 would be
able to fund their investments with deposits.
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The incentive compatibility constraint (3) characterizes the banks choice of p given the
repayment b(; )(1   k(; )): The depositorsand the outside shareholdersparticipation
constraints (4) and (5) ensure that they get the required expected return on their investments
in the bank.
The following result characterizes the bankscapital and risk decisions for a given cost
of capital .
Proposition 1 The capital and risk decisions of a bank of type  when the cost of capital is
  0 are
k(; ) = 1  a
2
2

1  1
(1 + 2)2

; (6)
p(; ) =

2

1 +
1
1 + 2

: (7)
Only banks with types   (); where
() =
s
1 + 2
a(1 + )
; (8)
will operate.
The level of capital k(; ) chosen by the banks is decreasing in their type  (so safer
banks have less capital) and in the cost of bank capital  (so banks economize on capital
when it becomes more expensive). In the limit case  = 0; where the cost of bank capital
equals the expected return required by depositors, we have k(; 0) = 1; that is all banks will
be 100% equity nanced. The intuition for this result is straightforward. Bank capital helps
to ameliorate the risk-shifting problem but it is in general more expensive than deposits,
except in the limit case  = 0 where there is no trade-o¤, and hence banks choose to be fully
funded with equity.
The probability of success p(; ) chosen by the banks is increasing in their type  (so
banks with high s are indeed safer) and is decreasing in the cost of bank capital  (so when
banks economize on capital they become riskier). In the limit case  = 0; where banks are
100% equity nanced, we have p(; 0) = ; which is the rst-best probability of success.
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The depositorsparticipation constraint (4) implies
b(; ) =
1
p(; )
;
which means that the e¤ects of  and  on the deposit rate b(; ) have the opposite sign of
their e¤ects on the probability of success p(; ): In other words, safer banks either by nature
(high ) or by choice (low ) pay lower deposit rates.
Finally, the type () of the marginal bank (whose inside shareholders are indi¤erent
between operating and not operating it) is increasing in the cost of bank capital : Hence an
increase in  reduces the set of banks that operate in the economy (of types  2 [(); 1]) and
also reduces the demand for capital of the operating banks. This means that the aggregate
demand for bank capital
K() =
Z 1
()
k(; ) d (9)
will be decreasing in the cost of capital :
The equilibrium cost of bank capital b is found by equating the aggregate demand for
bank capital K() to the xed supply K, that is by solving the equation
K(b) = K: (10)
We are going to assume that the aggregate supply of bank capital K is such that b > 0:
By Proposition 1 this requiresZ 1
(0)
k(; 0) d =
Z 1
a 1=2
d = 1  a 1=2 > K;
which may be rewritten as
a(1 K)2 > 1: (11)
Since each operating bank invests a unit of funds, aggregate investment in this economy
is equal to the mass of banks that operate in equilibrium, that is
bI = 1  b;
where b = (b): Given that K() is decreasing and () is increasing in ; it follows that a
contraction in the supply of bank capital K will increase the equilibrium cost of bank capitalb and reduce aggregate investment bI in the economy.
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An interesting feature of this model, which contrasts with many models in the banking
literature, is that banks will voluntarily choose to have a positive level of capital k(; ) > 0:
There are two reasons for this result. First, having capital k reduces the required amount
of deposits 1   k; which ameliorates the risk-shifting problem generated by debt nance.
Second, this e¤ect reduces the interest rate b of uninsured deposits, and hence the face value
b(1 k) of the debt to be repaid at t = 1; which further ameliorates the risk-shifting problem.
3 Optimal Bank Capital Regulation
To motivate bank capital regulation we are going to consider that bank failures entail a
social cost. A convenient parameterization is to assume that for a bank of type  this cost is
equal to ca; that is a proportion c > 0 of the success payo¤ of the banks investment under
the rst-best probability of success p = , which is a(2   p) = a. Since this cost is not
internalized by the banks, their choice of capital and risk will be socially ine¢ cient.
To deal with this externality, we introduce a risk-neutral regulator whose objective func-
tion is to maximize social welfare. The regulator faces the same informational constraints
as the market, in particular the inability to directly control banksrisk-taking, so it resorts
to using capital requirements to indirectly inuence bankschoice of risk. To get interior
solutions to the optimal capital requirements, we assume that parameter c satises7
c <
2[a(1 K)2   1]
1 + 2aK(1 K) : (12)
In our risk-neutral economy, social welfare is measured by the sum of the expected payo¤s
of depositors and bank (inside and outside) shareholders, minus the expected social cost
associated with bank failures. But since depositors receive the required return on their
contribution to banksnancing, we can ignore their payo¤ in the welfare calculations.
The optimal capital requirements are obtained as a solution (k(); b(); p(); ) to the
following problem
max
(k();b();p();)
Z 1

[p [a(2   p)  b(1  k)]  (1  p)ca] d (13)
7Note that condition (11) implies that the right-hand side of condition (12) is positive.
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subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
p() = argmax
p
p [a(2   p)  b()(1  k())] ; for all ; (14)
the depositorsparticipation constraint
p()b() = 1; for all ; (15)
and the capital availability constraintZ 1

k() d = K: (16)
The integrand of the regulators objective function (13) has two components: The rst one
is the banksexpected prots and the second one, with negative sign, is the expected social
cost of bank failure. The integral ranges from  (the type of the riskiest bank that is allowed
to operate) to 1 (the type of the safest bank). In choosing the optimal capital requirement
k() for each type of bank   , the regulator takes into account that the bank will be
optimally setting the deposit rate b() to raise the required deposits 1 k(). This explains
the incentive compatibility constraint (14) and the depositorsparticipation constraint (15),
which are identical to the constraints (3) and (4) in the case of the unregulated bank. The
regulator also takes into account the overall availability of bank capital in constraint (16).
Since the rst-order condition that characterizes the solution to the incentive compati-
bility constraint (14) is
a(2   p())  b()(1  k()) = ap(); (17)
the objective function may be written asZ 1


ap2   (1  p)ca d (18)
The following result characterizes the optimal capital requirements.
Proposition 2 If c satises condition (12), the optimal capital requirements and corre-
sponding risk decisions for a bank of type  are
k() = 1  a
2
2
"
1 

1 + c
2  1
2#
; (19)
p() =

2

1 +
1 + c
2  1

; (20)
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where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the capital availability constraint (16).
The values of  and the type  of the marginal bank are obtained as the unique solution to
the system formed by the capital availability constraint (16) and the condition
a(p())2   (1  p())ca   k() = 0 (21)
that the contribution of the marginal bank to social welfare be zero, and satisfy
1 + c
2  1 < 1: (22)
The Lagrange multiplier  is the shadow value of bank capital, that is the increase in
social welfare resulting from a marginal increase in the aggregate supply of bank capital. As
in Kashyap and Stein (2004), the optimal capital requirements k() are decreasing in .
Proposition 2 shows that the Lagrange multiplier  and the type  of the marginal bank are
obtained by solving a system of two equations: The capital availability constraint (16) and
the condition (21) that the contribution of the marginal bank to social welfare be zero. The
rst condition implies a downward sloping relationship between  and : If bank capital
becomes more valuable, then according to (19) the regulator will lower capital requirements
so more banks will be allowed to operate and the type of the marginal bank will be lower.
The second condition implies an upward sloping relationship between  and : If bank
capital becomes more valuable, then the marginal bank must be of a higher type. Hence
there is (at most) a unique intersection between the two functions that determines  and :
The result (22) implies that the optimal capital requirements k() set by the regulator
are decreasing in the banks type  (so safer banks are required to have less capital). The
corresponding probabilities of success p() chosen by the banks are increasing in their type
 (so banks with high s are indeed safer).
The proof of Proposition 2 shows that when the parameter c that characterizes the social
cost of bank failure reaches the upper bound in (12), the Lagrange multiplier  satises
(1 + c)=(2  1) = 1; in which case (19) and (20) become k() = 1 (100% capital require-
ments) and p() =  (the rst-best probability of success). The intuition for this result is
clear. When the social cost of bank failure is su¢ ciently large, the primary objective of the
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regulator becomes to minimize the probability of bank failure, which obtains when banks
are solely nanced with equity.
Under the optimal regulation there will be a corresponding equilibrium cost of bank capital
 determined by the condition that the inside shareholders of the marginal bank of type 
must be indi¤erent between operating and not operating it. Assuming that banks do not
want to have more capital than the one required by regulation (this will be shown to be the
case in Proposition 3 below), the equilibrium condition in the market for bank capital will
coincide with the capital availability constraint (16) in the regulators problem, so the type
of the marginal bank will be : Hence the equilibrium cost of bank capital  under the
optimal regulation will be determined by the condition
a(p())2   (1 + )k() = 0; (23)
where the rst term in this expression is the expected prots of the marginal bank (using
the rst-order condition (17)), and the second is the required compensation of the outside
shareholders.
The following result compares the equilibrium with and without capital regulation.
Proposition 3 When the social cost of bank failure is zero the equilibrium allocation in the
absence of regulation is optimal. When c > 0 we have
k() > k(;b);
p() > p(;b);
I = 1   < 1  b = bI:
Moreover, banks do not want to have more capital than k().
There are three separate results in Proposition 3. The rst one states that when there
are no externalities associated with bank failures, the unregulated market equilibrium is
e¢ cient, with banks privately choosing the optimal amount of capital.8 In this case we have
8It is worth noting that this result would not obtain if deposits were insured, because then banks would
not want to have any capital.
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 = 1 + b; so the shadow value of bank capital equals the equilibrium private cost of bank
capital.
The second result states that when bank failures entail a social cost, the optimal reg-
ulation requires banks to have more capital than they would in the unregulated market
equilibrium, so they become safer. But there is a trade-o¤: With an exogenously given
supply of bank capital fewer banks will be operating, and hence aggregate investment will
fall.
The third result relates to the equilibrium cost of bank capital  under the optimal
regulation: For this value of the cost of capital, banks would not want to have more capital
than the level required by the regulator. This implies that the optimal regulation may be
implemented as a risk-based schedule of minimum capital requirements.
4 A Numerical Illustration
To illustrate our previous results, consider a numerical example in which we set the parameter
that characterizes the protability of the banksinvestments a = 5; and suppose that the
aggregate supply of bank capital K is such that the equilibrium cost of bank capital in the
absence of regulation is b = 12:5%:9
By Proposition 1 the equilibrium capital and risk decisions of a bank of type  are
k(;b) = 1  0:92; (24)
p(;b) = 0:9: (25)
Thus the safest bank (of type  = 1) will choose a level of capital k(1;b) = 10% and a
probability of success p(1;b) = 90%: Riskier banks (with  < 1) will have more capital, but
this will be insu¢ cient to compensate the worsening of the moral hazard problem, and they
will choose lower probabilities of success. Also by Proposition 1, the type of the marginal
bank that is indi¤erent between operating and not operating will be b = (b) = 4:5 1=2 =
9It should be noted that these and the other parameter values below are not intended to provide a cali-
bration of the model, since they are simply chosen to facilitate the graphical representation of the qualitative
results of the paper.
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0:471: Finally, the required aggregate supply of bank capital is given by
K =
Z 1
b k(;b) d = 0:260:
To compute the optimal capital requirements we set the social cost of bank failure c = 0:2:
Solving equations (16) and (21) gives a shadow value of bank capital  = 1:211 and a
marginal bank type  = 0:538: Hence by Proposition 2 the optimal capital requirements
and the corresponding risk decisions for a bank of type  are
k() = 1  0:7182; (26)
p() = 0:922: (27)
Thus the safest bank (of type  = 1) will face a capital requirement k(1) = 28:2% and
will choose a probability of success p(1) = 92:2%: Note that, as stated in Proposition
3, k() > k(;b) and p() > p(;b); so banks will have more capital and will be safer
than in the absence of regulation. However, given that there is a xed aggregate supply of
bank capital, requiring banks to have more capital will necessarily reduce the set of banks
that operate. In particular, the type of the marginal bank will increase from b = 0:471 to
 = 0:538: Therefore aggregate investment will fall by 12:6% from bI = 1   b = 0:529 to
I = 1    = 0:462: Finally, the equilibrium cost of capital will jump from b = 12:5% to
 = 55:3%; reecting the increase in the demand for bank capital generated by the optimal
regulation.
To illustrate the result, Figure 1 plots the functions k(;b) and k() in (24) and (26). To
facilitate the comparison with the standard capital charge curves à la Basel II, the variable
in the horizontal axis is 1  ; which is a measure of banksrisk. The two functions have a
similar shape, with the gap between k(;b) and k() becoming smaller when  tends to zero.
Figure 1 also shows the critical values I = 1  and bI = 1 b beyond which banks will not
be operating, respectively, with and without capital requirements. Under the assumption of
a uniform distribution of bank types, the integral below the curve k(;b) between 0 and bI
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Figure 1. Equilibrium capital and optimal capital
requirements for a xed supply of bank capital
This gure depicts the equilibrium capital decisions in the absence of regulation and the
optimal capital requirements for the di¤erent types of banks, with the corresponding
levels of aggregate investment in the horizontal axis. The sum of the areas of regions
A and B and the sum of the areas of regions B and C equals the aggregate supply of
bank capital.
equals the aggregate supply of bank capital K, and similarly the integral below the curve
k() between 0 and I also equals K: This means that the area of region A must be equal
to the area of region C:
Like in the case of risk-sensitive capital requirements à la Basel II, the optimal capital
requirements k() are increasing in the measure of banksrisk, 1  . However, our capital
requirements are not based on a purely statistical value-at-risk calculation, with an arbitrary
condence level, but follow from the maximization of the appropriate social welfare function.
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5 Cyclical Adjustment of Capital Requirements
This section considers the e¤ect of a negative shock to the aggregate supply of bank capital
under optimally adjusted and xed capital requirements.
Specically, suppose that the supply of bank capital goes down fromK0 to K1: Following
the discussion after Proposition 2, we rst derive the e¤ect of the shock on the values the
Lagrange multiplier  and the type  of the marginal bank. A reduction in the aggregate
supply of bank capital produces an upward shift in the downward sloping relationship be-
tween  and  implied by the capital availability constraint (16). Since the relationship
between  and  implied by the condition (21) on the zero contribution of the marginal
bank to social welfare is upward sloping, the e¤ect of the shock will be to increase the value
of the Lagrange multiplier ; reecting the higher shadow value of bank capital, and the
value of the type  of the marginal bank, reecting the need to shrink the set of banks that
will be allowed to operate in order to economize on scarce bank capital.
By Proposition 2, the increase in  will reduce the optimal capital requirements k()
and the probability of success p() of the operating banks. The intuition for these results is
clear: The optimal way to accommodate the shock in the aggregate supply of bank capital
is to reduce capital requirements in order to avoid the reduction in aggregate investment
that otherwise would obtain. The reduction in bank capital in turn explains the increase
in the probability of failure of the operating banks. Finally, the increase in the type  of
the marginal bank means that aggregate investment will fall, but by less than without the
reduction in capital requirements.
We may illustrate these results using our previous numerical example. In particular,
suppose that the aggregate supply of bank capital goes down by 25% from K0 = 0:260
(the value chosen in Section 4 to get an equilibrium cost of bank capital in the absence of
regulation b = 12:5%) to K1 = 0:195: Solving equations (16) and (21) now gives a shadow
value of bank capital 1 = 1:258 and a marginal bank type 

1 = 0:544: Hence by Proposition
2 the optimal capital requirements and the corresponding risk decisions for a bank of type 
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are now given by
k1() = 1  0:9322; (28)
p1() = 0:896: (29)
Comparing these results with (26) and (27), it follows that the reduction in capital require-
ments will be very signicant, but the e¤ect on bank risk will be relatively small. For
example, the capital requirement for the safest bank (of type  = 1) will be reduced from
k0(1) = 28:2% to k

1(1) = 6:8%; while the corresponding probability of success will go down
from p0(1) = 92:2% to p

1(1) = 89:6%: The marginal bank will now be of type 

1 = 0:544;
which means that aggregate investment will only fall by 1:3% from I0 = 1   0 = 0:462 to
I1 = 1  1 = 0:456: Finally, using (23) we conclude that the equilibrium cost of capital will
increase from 0 = 55:3% to 

1 = 64:3%; reecting the negative shock in the aggregate supply
of bank capital which is not fully compensated by the reduction in capital requirements.
Figure 2 plots the optimal capital requirements before and after the shock in the aggregate
supply of bank capital, as well as the critical values I0 = 1   0 and I1 = 1   1 beyond
which banks will not be operating, respectively, before and after the shock. As noted above,
the adjustment is made by reducing the set of operating banks and by lowering the capital
requirements for the banks that remain in operation. In the numerical example, the second
element of the adjustment is much more important than the rst.
We next consider what happens under a xed capital requirements regime in which capital
requirements are not optimally adjusted following the shock in the aggregate supply of bank
capital, but kept xed at k0(): In this case, the reduction in the supply of bank capital can
only be accommodated by a signicant reduction in the set of operating banks. Specically,
the type e1 of the marginal bank is found by solving the equationZ 1
e1 k

0() d = K1;
which gives e1 = 0:624: This implies that aggregate investment will fall by 18:6% from
I0 = 1  0 = 0:462 to eI1 = 1 e1 = 0:376: Finally, to ensure that the inside shareholders of
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Figure 2. Optimal capital requirements before
and after the shock to the supply of bank capital
This gure depicts the optimal capital requirements for the di¤erent types of banks
before and after the negative shock to the aggregate supply of bank capital, with the
corresponding levels of aggregate investment in the horizontal axis.
the marginal bank of type e1 will be indi¤erent between operating and not operating it, the
equilibrium cost of capital will jump from 0 = 55:3% to e1 = 129:5%:
Figure 3 shows the di¤erence in the adjustment to the shock in the aggregate supply of
bank capital when capital requirements are reduced from k0() to k

1() and when they are
kept xed at k0(): In the rst case, aggregate investment goes down to I

1 = 1  1 = 0:456;
while in the second it goes down to eI1 = 1 e1 = 0:376; reecting the fact that 100% of the
reduction in the demand for bank capital is achieved by increasing the cost of capital and
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Figure 3. Adjustment to the shock to the supply of bank
capital under xed and optimal capital requirements
This gure shows the adjustment to the negative shock in the aggregate supply of bank
capital when capital requirements are kept xed and when they are optimally reduced,
with the corresponding levels of aggregate investment in the horizontal axis. The sum
of the areas of regions A and B and the sum of the areas of regions B and C equals
the new aggregate supply of bank capital.
consequently reducing the set of operating banks. As before, the integral below the curve
k1() between 0 and I

1 equals the aggregate supply of bank capital K1, and similarly the
integral below the curve k0() between 0 and eI1 also equals K1: This means that the area
of region A must be equal to the area of region C: This clearly illustrates the di¤erence in
the two adjustment mechanisms: Under the optimal regulation the smaller supply of bank
capital is distributed among a larger set of banks, so aggregate investment only falls to I1 ;
while under xed capital requirements the supply of bank capital is allocated to a smaller
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set of banks, so aggregate investment falls to eI1 < I1 :
Table 1 summarizes the e¤ects of a 25% reduction in the aggregate supply of bank
capital on the equilibrium cost of bank capital, aggregate investment, and social welfare
in the optimal and the xed capital requirements regimes. Under the optimal regulation
the greater part of the adjustment to the new environment is achieved by lowering capital
requirements, with only a relatively small increase in the cost of bank capital (which goes
from 0 = 55:3% to 

1 = 64:3%) and a reduction of only 1:3% in aggregate investment (from
I0 = 0:462 to I

1 = 0:456). Social welfare falls by a greater extent (by 7:3% fromW

0 = 1:101
to W 1 = 1:021) because the reduction in capital requirements makes banks riskier, and
hence their expected prots go down and the expected social cost of bank failure goes up.
In contrast, when capital requirements remain unchanged all the adjustment to the new
environment is achieved by increasing the cost of bank capital (which goes from 0 = 55:3%
to e1 = 129:5%), so there is a very signicant reduction in aggregate investment (of 18:6%
from I0 = 0:462 to eI1 = 0:376). Although the operating banks are safer than in the optimal
regulation, the reduction in investment leads to a greater fall in social welfare (of 9:1% from
W 0 = 1:101 to fW1 = 1:001).
Table 1. E¤ect of a 25% reduction in the supply of bank capital
under xed and optimal capital requirements
Initial optimal New optimal Fixed capital
capital requirements capital requirements requirements
Equilibrium cost of capital () 55:3% 64:3% 129:5%
Aggregate investment (I) 0:462 0:456 0:376
Social welfare (W ) 1:101 1:021 1:001
This table reports the equilibrium cost of bank capital, aggregate investment, and social welfare
under optimal capital requirements for the initial aggregate supply of bank capital (column 1) and
after a 25 percent reduction in this supply (column 2), as well as the results for the case in which
the initial capital requirements are not adjusted (column 3).
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The optimal adjustment of capital requirements yields an increase of 2:0% in social welfare
(from fW1 = 1:001 to W 1 = 1:021). This di¤erence may be decomposed as follows:
W 1  fW1 = Z 1
1

a(p1())
2   (1  p1())ca

d  
Z 1
e1

a(p0())
2   (1  p0())ca

d
=
Z e1
1

a(p1())
2   (1  p1())ca

d
 
Z 1
e1 a

(p1())
2   (p0())2

d  
Z 1
e1 [p

1()  p0()] ca d;
where the rst term in the last expression is the welfare gain due to the higher investment,
the second is the welfare loss due to fact that operating banks choose riskier (and hence less
e¢ cient) investments, and the third is the welfare loss due to the higher probability of bank
failures. The numerical values of the three terms are
W 1  fW1 = 0:087  0:060  0:007 = 0:020:
Thus there is an increase in social welfare of 8:7% associated with the higher investment,
which is almost compensated by a decrease of 6:0% due to the reduction in the protability
of the operating banks, and a decrease of 0:7% due to the higher social cost of bank failures.10
Summing up, our numerical results illustrate the qualitative results of our model, namely
that a negative shock to the aggregate supply of bank capital should be partially accommo-
dated by a reduction in capital requirements. Otherwise, banks would be safer but there
would be an excessive reduction in the level of economic activity, which would lead to a
greater reduction in social welfare.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a simple model of optimal bank capital regulation that provides a ra-
tionale for the cyclical adjustment of risk-sensitive capital requirements. Specically, capital
requirements should be lowered in situations where bank capital is scarce such as economic
10It should be noted that the di¤erence in welfare terms between adjusting and not adjusting the capital
requirements is relatively small. This is explained by the fact that we are taking as reference an initial
optimal regulation, so limK1!K0(W

1  fW1) = 0: I am grateful to Douglas Gale for pointing this out.
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downturns. The trade-o¤ behind the result is explained by Kashyap and Stein (2004) in the
following terms: When bankslending activities are more severely constrained it is socially
desirable to accept a higher probability of bank default (...) It cannot make sense for bank
lending to bear the entire brunt of the adjustment, while the expected costs of defaults
remain constant.
The results provide a balanced assessment of the costs and benets of adjusting capital
requirements to the state of the business cycle. In particular, from a social welfare perspec-
tive it is incorrect either to focus exclusively on the potential credit crunch e¤ects of the
regulation, if capital requirements are not lowered in recessions, or to focus exclusively on
the greater likelihood of bank failures, if they are. Thus, from a practical point of view,
it seems important to integrate a macroprudential with a microprudential perspective. In
this regard, the results of the paper are very much in line with those in Repullo and Suarez
(2012), who provide a call for caution against the simple claim that if regulation induces
cyclicality it needs to be radically adjusted: the adjustment is not a free lunch.
The results also provide a rationale for the recapitalization of banks with public funds
following a negative shock to their capital, as was done in the Capital Purchase Program
of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). If the shadow value of bank capital after
the shock is greater than the social cost of public funds, such intervention would be welfare
improving.11
In contrast with the Basel II regulation, which is based on the value-at-risk criterion
that capital must cover losses with a certain condence level, our model focusses on welfare
optimal capital requirements. However, using the results in the proof of Proposition 1, we
could easily compute the capital requirements for a condence level  2 (0; 1),12 which would
be
k() = minfmaxf1  2a(   ); 0g; 1g:
Providing a rationale for a cyclical adjustment of capital requirements would be more com-
11I am grateful to Diana Hancock for pointing this out.
12Setting p(; k) =  in (33), and solving for k gives k() = 1  2a(   ): The operators maxf; 0g and
minf; 1g serve to bound the capital requirement between 0 and 1 (and they are in general binding for high
and low values of ; respectively).
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plicated in this setup because the safest banks will want to have more capital than the one
prescribed by regulation. But the same logic would apply here: Capital requirements de-
signed for good times would be expected to be too high in bad times, so the condence level
 targeted by the regulator should be adjusted according to the state of the business cycle.
We would like to conclude with two caveats. First, the arrival of a recession may be
accompanied by other changes in the model such as reducing the size of the banksinvestment
opportunities, which was normalized to one, or its protability, captured by parameter a; or
shifting to the left the distribution of bank types. The rst e¤ect would reduce the demand
for capital, and hence the need for an adjustment of capital requirements, the second would
exacerbate the banksrisk-shifting incentives, and hence called for higher rather than lower
capital requirements, and the third e¤ect would go in the same direction, since it would
reduce the left-hand side of the capital availability constraint (16).
The second caveat is that our setup ignores feedback e¤ects from the level of investment
and economic activity to the protability of the banksinvestments. One could introduce
these e¤ects by making the protability parameter a an increasing (and possibly concave)
function of the level of aggregate investment I: This would capture demand externalities
or technological complementarities similar to those studies in endogenous growth theory.
Although the analysis of optimal regulation would be more complicated, it is clear that such
e¤ects would strengthen the rationale for the cyclical adjustment of capital requirements.
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Appendix
A The model with an elastic supply of bank capital
This Appendix shows that our previous results are robust to the introduction of an upward-
sloping aggregate supply of bank capital. Specically, suppose that supply of capital K is
given by
K = K + ; (30)
where  is the cost of capital, and K and  are positive constants.13
To derive the optimal capital requirements we have to modify the regulators objective
function by subtracting the opportunity cost of bank capital, which is given by the triangle
area below the supply function
(K  K)
2
=
2
2
:
The optimal capital requirements are obtained as a solution (k(); b(); p(); ; ) to
the following problem
max
(k();b();p();;)
Z 1

[p [a(2   p)  b(1  k)]  (1  p)ca] d   
2
2

subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (14), the depositorsparticipation constraint
(15), the participation constraint (23) of the marginal bank of type ; and the capital
availability constraint Z 1

k() d = K + ; (31)
Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 2, we can write the regulators
problem as
max
(k();;)
Z 1


a(p(; k))2   (1  p(; k))ca   k d+(K+) 2
2
+[a(p())2 (1+)k()];
where  denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the capital availability constraint
(31),  denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the participation constraint (23),
13Note that the case with  = 0 (which implies K = K) corresponds to our previous analysis.
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and p(; k) is given by (33). Di¤erentiating the integrand with respect to k gives a rst-
order condition whose solution is k() in (19), and substituting this result into (33) and
rearranging gives p() in (20). Di¤erentiating objective function with respect to  gives
the rst-order condition
a(p())2   (1  p())ca   k() + 

2ap()
@p()
@
  (1 + )@k
()
@

= 0:
And di¤erentiating objective function with respect to  gives the rst-order condition
(  )  k() = 0:
These two conditions, together with the capital availability constraint (31) and the partici-
pation constraint (23), form a system of four equations with four unknowns: the type  of
the marginal bank, the cost of capital ; and the two Lagrange multipliers  and :
To illustrate the results for the model with an elastic supply of bank capital, we set
a = 5; c = 0:2 (the same parameters as before), and  = 0:1; and solve for the optimal
capital requirements for two di¤erent values of the intercept K in (30), namely the values
K0 = 0:260 and K1 = 0:195 used in Section 5. The results are given by
k0() = 1  0:3542;
k1() = 1  0:5632:
Therefore the optimal response to the negative shock in the aggregate supply of bank capital
is to lower capital requirements. The marginal bank is of type 0 = 0:572 before the shock
and of type 1 = 0:574 after the shock, so aggregate investment will fall by 0:4% from I

0 =
1 0 = 0:428 to I1 = 1 1 = 0:426: As before, social welfare falls by 6:3% fromW 0 = 1:155
to W 1 = 1:082. But if the capital requirements are not optimally adjusted after the shock,
but kept xed at k0(); aggregate investment will fall by 9:5% to eI1 = 1   e1 = 0:387; and
social welfare will fall by 7:1% to fW1 = 1:074: As in the case of the model with an inelastic
supply of bank capital, the optimal adjustment of capital requirements yields an increase of
only 0:8% in social welfare (from fW1 = 1:074 to W 1 = 1:082); because the welfare gain due
to the higher investment is almost compensated by the fact that the operating banks are less
protable and more likely to fail.
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B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 The rst-order condition that characterizes the solution to the
banks incentive compatibility constraint (3) is
a(2   p)  b(1  k) = ap: (32)
Substituting the depositors participation constraint pb = 1 into this expression gives a
quadratic equation whose solution is
p(; k) =
1
2
 
 +
r
2   2(1  k)
a
!
; (33)
where we have chosen the solution with the highest p, which is closest to the rst-best p = 
and hence the one preferred by the bank.
To derive the optimal choice of capital, substitute the outside shareholdersparticipation
constraint (5) and the rst-order condition (32) into the banks objective function (2) to get
(1  )p [a(2   p)  b(1  k)] = p [a(2   p)  b(1  k)]  (1 + )k = ap2   (1 + )k: (34)
Substituting (33) into this expression and di¤erentiating with respect to k gives the rst-
order condition
 +
q
2   2(1 k)
a
2
q
2   2(1 k)
a
= 1 + :
Solving for k in this condition gives k(; ) in (6), and substituting this result into (33) and
rearranging gives p(; ) in (7).
Finally, substituting p(; ) and k(; ) into (34) gives
a [p(; )]2   (1 + )k(; ) = a2

1 + 
1 + 2
2
  (1 + )

1  a
2
2

1  1
(1 + 2)2

 0;
which simplies to
a2
1 + 
1 + 2
 1;
Hence the expected payo¤ of the inside shareholders will be nonnegative for   (); where
() is given by (8). 
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Proof of Proposition 2 Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1, we
can solve the rst-order condition that characterizes the solution to the banks incentive
compatibility constraint (14) together with the depositorsparticipation constraint (15) to
get a quadratic equation in p whose solution is (33). Then we can write the regulators
problem as
max
(k();)
Z 1


a(p(; k))2   (1  p(; k))ca   k d + K;
where  denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the capital availability constraint
(16). Di¤erentiating the integrand with respect to k gives the rst-order condition
(1 + c) +
q
2   2(1 k)
a
2
q
2   2(1 k)
a
= :
Solving for k in this condition gives k() in (19), and substituting this result into (33) and
rearranging gives p() in (20).
Di¤erentiating the regulators objective function with respect to  gives the rst-order
condition
F (; ) = a(p())2   (1  p())ca   k() = 0; (35)
which states that the contribution to social welfare of the marginal bank of type  is zero.
The values of the Lagrange multiplier  and the type  of the marginal bank are found by
solving (35) together with the capital availability constraint
G(; ) =
Z 1

k() d  K = 0: (36)
To show that these two equations have at most a unique solution it su¢ ces to show that
@F (; )
@
> 0 and
@F (; )
@
< 0;
so the relationship between  and  implicit in (35) is increasing, and that
@G(; )
@
< 0 and
@G(; )
@
< 0;
so the relationship between  and  implicit in (36) is decreasing. The latter results are
immediate from (36) and the expression (19) for k(); since
@G(; )
@
=  k() < 0 and @G(
; )
@
=
Z 1

@k()
@
d < 0:
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Next di¤erentiating (35) with respect to  and using the expression (20) for p(); equation
(35), and the expression (19) for k() gives
@F (; )
@
= 2ap()
@p()
@
  @
@
[(1  p())ca]  @k
()
@
=
2


a(p())2   (1  p())ca+ ca  @k()
@
=
2

k() + ca  @k
()
@
> 0:
Finally, di¤erentiating (35) with respect to  and using the expressions (20) for p() and
(19) for k() gives
@F (; )
@
= [2ap() + ca]
@p()
@
  @k
()
@
  k()
=  

2
a(1 + c)
(2  1)

(1 + c)
(2  1)2 + 2
a ()2 (1 + c)2
(2  1)3   k
()
=  k() < 0:
The upper bound in (12) for c is derived as follows. Suppose that the Lagrange multiplier
 satises (1+ c)=(2  1) = 1; in which case (19) and (20) become k() = 1 and p() = :
For any constant k (which we are going to set at k = 1) the capital availability constraint
(16) becomes Z 1

k d = k(1  ) = K;
which implies
 = 1  K
k
:
Di¤erentiating with respect to k the regulators objective function evaluated at k = 1 gives
d
dk
Z 1


a [p(; k)]2   [1  p(; k)]ca d = Z 1


1 +
c
2

d   a()2   (1  )ca d
dk
=

1 +
c
2

K   [a(1 K)2   caK(1 K)]K;
where we have used the fact that
d
dk

k=1
=
d
dk

1  K
k

k=1
= K:
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Starting from the corner k = 1; a reduction in k will increase social welfare if
1 +
c
2

K   [a(1 K)2   caK(1 K)]K < 0;
which gives condition (12) and implies that the Lagrange multiplier  satises (22). 
Proof of Proposition 3When the social cost of bank failure c = 0 it is immediate to check
that the conditions F (; ) = 0 and G(; ) = 0 dened in (35) and (36) are satised for
 = b and  = 1 + b: Hence comparing (6) and (7) with (19) and (20) we conclude that
k() = k(;b) and p() = p(;b):
The analyze the e¤ect of an increase in c we rst compute
@G(; )
@c
=
Z 1

@k()
@c
d > 0;
and
@F (; )
@c
= [2ap() + ca]
@p()
@c
  (1  p())a   @k
()
@c
=

2
a(1 + c)
(2  1)


2(2  1)   
a ()2 (1 + c)
(2  1)2   (1  p
())a
=  (1  p())a < 0:
Hence an increase in c produces an upward shift the relationship between  and  implicit
in both (35) and (36) (putting  in the horizontal axis), which implies d=dc > 0 (and an
ambiguous e¤ect on ). Since for c = 0 we have  = b; this implies I = 1   < 1 b = bI
for c > 0; so aggregate investment will be lower under the optimal regulation.
Next using the condition that determines the equilibrium cost of capital in the absence
of regulation (10) and the capital availability constraint (16) we haveZ 1
b k(;b) d =
Z 1

k() d = K:
Using the result  > b we haveZ 
b k(;b) d +
Z 1

h
k(;b)  k()i d = 0;
which implies Z 1

h
k(;b)  k()i d < 0:
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But by (6) and (19) we have
k(;b)  k() = a2
2
"
1
(1 + 2b)2  

1 + c
2  1
2#
;
so it must be the case that k(;b) < k() for all  2 [; 1]; which proves that the optimal
regulation requires banks to have more capital than they would in the absence of regulation.
By (33) this in turn implies p(;b) < p() for all  2 [; 1]; so banks are safer than in the
absence of regulation.
Finally, to prove that the optimal capital requirements will be binding we rst show that
 < 1 + : By the proof of Proposition 2, the rst-order condition that characterizes the
type  of the marginal bank is
a(p())2   (1  p())ca   k() = 0:
This condition together the condition (23) that characterizes the equilibrium cost of bank
capital  under the optimal regulation gives
(1 +    )k() = (1  p())ca > 0;
which implies  < 1+:We want to show that the derivative with respect to k of the banks
objective function (34) evaluated at the optimal capital requirement k() is negative, that
is
2ap(; k)
@p(; k)
@k
< 1 + :
But the rst-order condition in Proposition 2 that characterizes the optimal capital require-
ments k() is
2ap(; k)
@p(; k)
@k
+ ca
@p(; k)
@k
   = 0:
Using the fact that @p(; k)=@k > 0 by (33) and the result  < 1 + ; this implies
2ap(; k)
@p(; k)
@k
=  ca@p(; k)
@k
+  < 1 + ;
as required. 
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